NPP inspection in Corona times: About the work of a Safeguard

Giuseppe Biino spends almost one month a year at the Beznau nuclear power plant. Sometimes half a day, sometimes a few days in a row. Biino checks on behalf of the federal government that no nuclear material is being misused. With Corona, these inspections have become even more complex.

Giuseppe Biino (60) takes his racing bike for the 120 kilometres from his home to Beznau. Almost every time. There and back. Even before Corona.

Giuseppe Biino is one of six specialists of the Swiss Federal Office of Energy - called Safeguards. In Switzerland, they control the nuclear material stocks in nuclear installations and laboratories that work with nuclear material. He has been with the SFOE for a good five years, prior to which he worked for 10 years at Mühleberg nuclear power plant, having originally studied geophysics.

The SFOE safeguards are often accompanied by one or two inspectors from the IAEA, the International Atomic Energy Agency based in Vienna and the persons responsible for the safeguards at the nuclear power plant.

Consultation with the border authorities

Last year, more than 60 inspections took place in Switzerland, i.e. on average more than one per week. With Corona, however, everything has become somewhat more complicated. For example, the question arose: how do you organise such inspections when the borders are closed? Air traffic is paralysed, so to speak? Simply canceling because of Corona is not an option.

The SFOE acted quickly, coordinating with the customs authorities and the border police so that the IAEA inspectors could enter Switzerland at a specific border crossing at a specific time. By car to comply with the Corona regulations.

First to the doctor

As far as the journey was concerned, the cyclist Giuseppe Biino was already Corona-compliant. Nevertheless there were changes for him too. He had to have his state of health checked by a doctor before every inspection. This prolonged the inspections, says Biino and adds: "The power plants lay down the rules that must be followed in the event of a pandemic (mask, distance, travel, quarantine). The basis is the measures taken by the Federal Office of Public Health, but the plants can also set more restrictive rules and in accordance with the precautionary principle they did so"

Independent of Corona: Anyone who works as a safeguard must have integrity, and this is also regularly checked. After all, it is the inspectors' job to prove on behalf of Switzerland that no nuclear material is diverted to a weapons programme. Switzerland committed itself to this in the Non-Proliferation Treaty of 1977.

The Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, also known as the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT), is an international treaty that prohibits the proliferation of nuclear weapons and imposes an obligation to disarm them, as well as the right to the "peaceful use" of nuclear energy.

The Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty was initiated by the five nuclear powers USA, France, PR China, Great Britain and the Soviet Union and has meanwhile (2015) been signed or acceded to by 191 states parties. Only four states have not become members of the Non-Proliferation Treaty: India, Israel, Pakistan and Southern Sudan. North Korea withdrew from the treaty in January 2003 and its final status has since been kept open by the NPT community. Switzerland ratified the Treaty in 1977.

With the so-called Safeguard Agreement, the measures and provisions for implementing the Non-Proliferation Treaty were defined and agreed. This additional protocol has been signed by 134 states. An agreement of this kind has existed with Switzerland since 1978, which obliges the countries to pass on detailed information to the IAEA. Safeguards are in use in a total of 182 states.

"We trace the "life" of the fuel elements from their importation into Switzerland to their final storage." Every step, every move is meticulously documented. Does the fuel element bear the correct number? Is it in the right place? Is it not a dummy?

For example, when the crane loads the containers from the reactor building onto the transport wagon, Giuseppe Biino and the other guards climb up onto the roof. "We keep track of the fuel elements in the cask at all times."

"We validate the history of nuclear material"

The SFOE documents the history of the fuel elements and transmits the data to the IAEA. The task of the SFOE is to validate this history, says Giuseppe Biino, so that the IAEA can check the data for plausibility.

Giuseppe Biino takes out a small shoulder bag - with a green and pink floral pattern. It contains everything he needs for the inspection. The most important thing: the inspection report: an A4 sheet of paper - folded together - on which is written what will be checked during the upcoming inspection.

Also in this purse:

- Dosimeter and SFOE ID card: The security outside the main gate to the nuclear power plant doesn't know everyone. At the main gate, the door only opens after the iris scan.
- A memory stick, in case it has to transfer photos from the inspection.
- A black notebook: Biino has stuck various copies inside with nuclear-specific information. "He knows a lot by heart", he says. But sometimes he has to resort to this written back-up, especially when the inspections take place outside office hours.
- A pencil with a string, attached to the pouch, "so he won't fall in anywhere."

The IAEA has stored large measuring instruments required for inspection in the nuclear facility because they are too heavy to be transported each time. Smaller measuring instruments are brought by the inspectors. In addition to the safeguards, plant employees are always present. For example, when it comes to moving a crane. If a seal has to be removed, only the IAEA safeguards do it.

The SFOE and IAEA Safeguards carry out inspections at all Swiss nuclear power plants (Beznau I and II, Gösgen, Leibstadt and Mühleberg) and also at the interim storage facility in Würenlingen. But also in the laboratories of research institutes and at companies that have nuclear materials at their disposal, including PSI and CERN.
Giuseppe Biino says that it is more likely that inconsistencies with nuclear material occur in the laboratories. For example, if material is ordered for research purposes but has not yet been declared. The IAEA was aware of the delivery and immediately initiated investigations. The IAEA also carries out unannounced inspections, in which case the SFOE inspector must also go to the site as quickly as possible.

During the revision, when the NPP is shut down - additional cameras are installed in advance to monitor areas that would otherwise be sealed, such as the reactor room. This is because external workers in the NPP are often busy with other work during this time.

In the air, in the cooling pond, in the dry storage - everywhere the existing material is verified. An underwater camera is used to check the numbers and location of the fuel rods. A special device is used to check whether the fuel elements are lit. If the blue "Cherenkov radiation" cannot be seen on used fuel elements, this indicates that they are dummy.

Sometimes the inspections last two to three hours, sometimes several days in a row. Switzerland has a good reputation with the IAEA, says Giuseppe Biino.

But hecticness is out of place at work. "We work concentrated and carefully." And it can get hot. The outer surface of the containers is 70 degrees, the humidity in the reactor building is high. Giuseppe Biino likes his work. Cooling down and airing out, he can do that again when he's on his way home on his racing bike.

Brigitte Mader, Communications Federal Office of Energy